Thursday, May 28, 2015

On The Existence of Free Will

It seems all a great mystery, whether or not we are truly free. Authors have written narratives centered around the idea of free will since fiction became a popular pastime. It's a great theological debate on whether or not we are truly free to make our own decisions or not. It certainly seems that way at times. After all, people should be accountable for their actions. One should't be allowed to escape from consequences simply because they can claim that they are not free to do as they choose. But how can one factor the idea of free will into a causal and scientific universe? These conflicting ideas seem to create two distinct camps with opposite views. A dichotomy, if you will. But dichotomies are almost always wrong.

However, let us examine the two sides of the story first. In the first place, the idea of free will existing. It almost seems it must. You can choose whether or not to move your left index finger now, or the next second, or not all. Plus, as I mentioned earlier, how can people be held accountable for their actions without the idea of their having made their own decisions that allowed them to commit an act that was against a set of laws? If one factors out the idea of free will, many questions open up, whose iterations never seem to end, as is what happens when someone tries to answer a subjective question objectively. So the answer to this subjective question must be subjective as well, hence free will must exist to some extent. Not to mention that the causal model of the universe entirely ignores superstring theory of branching time, and quantum probability. To try to eliminate this idea opens up a whole untangle-able can of worms.

Next, free will not existing. How can free will exist in our causal and physical existence? If we allow the idea of free will separate from external influences, aka, free from causal interference like everything else, then the only thing else it can be is random. A random influence upon our "consciousness"? The idea isn't free will, yet how can something be free and non-causal, yet not random? The idea causes cognitive dissonance because it's impossible. Yes, there is probability, and time branches, but these are not caused by free will, but by the probabilistic nature of the universe. No free will involved.

So, who is right?

Well, it's presented as a dichotomy, so let's step back and allow for the idea that neither are 100% correct. First, let's do this by realizing that there is a difference between free will and just plain will. Second, that even in the causal model of the universe, you still have to deal with your epistemic horizon, that is, you can only know so much about yourself and what makes you do what. Third, quantum probability does factor in to allow for superstring theory, but only over a broad spread.

Here is the solution as I see it: free will itself is an illusion, but will, the intent, is entirely different and real. The epistemic horizon allows for the complete illusion of free will. So you are predictable, and not technically free of causal relationships. But only over a short period of time, and by that, I mean, a subjective estimate of how someone will immediately react (so long you have enough information about said person and the stimuli they will receive) (also emphasis on estimate). The quantum probability and time branching means that the future is not deterministic. Everything is still probabilistic, but there are simply things that are more likely to happen that others. So there isn't free will, but the future is still random. It's just not up to your decisions on how things pan out in your reality.

To sum up: no. There isn't such a free will. It's an illusion caused by being human. But we should continue to pretend for ethical reasons, the fact that the future is still probable, will still exists, and I am not one to advocate anarchy.

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